Version 14 of source protection

Updated 2010-06-07 21:49:32 by br

[Why it matters]

There are several issues here [This seems like it has likely been discussed elsewhere on the wiki - perhaps some pointers are appropriate?]

  • One may wish to prevent the user of an application from knowing what is being done algorithmically, out of security concerns.
  • One may wish to prevent the user from knowing what is being done out of intellectual property concerns
  • One may wish to prevent the user from modifying the code out of maintenance support concerns
  • One may wish to prevent the user from modifying the code to prevent abuse (for instance, to hopefully limit the amount of cheating one might do in multi-player games)

[Why Java, C, ... aren't really all that hot for security.]

[Distinguish obfuscation and full-blown encryption.]

It is practical to deliver encrypted Tcl-coded applications. Steve Blinkhorn, for example, has written, "Various of my Tclkit-based projects are delivered using blowfish encryption, with some extra attention given to the security of keys. There's nothing especially difficult about doing this with single-file Starpacks, and the actual encryption code is miniscule - I routinely build starkits with multiple versions of a mini-extension for various platforms, with little impact on the overall size. For instance, a version of tclhttpd with some custom code (including encryption) packaged up as a single-file executable with tclkit has 300Kbytes or so to spare for a document tree and still fits on a 3.5" floppy, is in live use now, doesn't crash and supports some quite complex client-server transactions with a Metakit database (the code for which, of course, comes as part of the Tclkit executable).

With a two-file (Starkit) solution, it is possible to update client software on remote sites transparently, so far as the user is concerned, and on a user-by-user basis, because the .kit file looks to the executable like a file system."


JBR - It doesn't seem possible to deliver a script that can be executed by the Tcl interpreter that cannot be viewed by a determined individual. If the boot strap application code can find and use a decryption key so can the attacker. This is the underlying and inescapable flaw in all encrypted content delivery schemes (DRM).

Kroc - It doesn't really matter because Tcl interpreter can runs strings human beings can't understand.

The Tcl interpreter runs byte code. Last I checked it can be formatted and understood.


Tcl packages and applications related to this topic:


Category Concept